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Abstract
An emerging research programme on diffusion across regional international organisations (RIOs) proposes
that decisions taken in one RIO affect decision-making in other RIOs. This work has provided a welcome
corrective to endogenously-focused accounts of RIOs. Nevertheless, by focusing on the ﬁnal design of
policies and institutional arrangements, it has been conceptually overly narrow. This has led to a truncated
understanding of diffusion’s impact and to an unjustiﬁed view of convergence as its primary outcome.
Drawing on public policy and sociological research, we offer a conceptual framework that seeks to remedy
these weaknesses by disaggregating the decision-making process on the ‘receiving’ side. We suggest that
policies and institutional arrangements in RIOs result from three decision-making stages: problematisation
(identiﬁcation of something as a political problem), framing (categorisation of the problem and possible
solutions), and scripting (design of ﬁnal solutions). Diffusion can affect any combination of these stages.
Consequently, its effects are more varied and potentially extensive than is currently recognised, and
convergence and persistent variation in scripting are both possible outcomes. We illustrate our framework
by re-evaluating research on dispute settlement institutions in the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. We conclude
by discussing its theoretical implications and the conditions that likely promote diffusion.
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Introduction
A growing literature on diffusion in political science, sociology, economics, and law argues that
rules, organisational norms, and models developed in one political setting shape organisational
decision-making in other settings. This theoretical perspective underpins an emerging research
programme on diffusion across regional international organisations (RIOs). Scholars suggest that
RIOs are not atomistic entities whose emergence and evolution can be understood in isolation from
other RIOs. Instead, underlying decision-making processes are interdependent because of material,
social, and cultural connections between RIOs.1 Many of these new studies have shown convincingly
* Correspondence to: Tobias Lenz, MaxWeber Fellow at the European University Institute, and Assistant Professor at
Göttingen University and the GIGAGerman Institute of Global and Area Studies. Author’s email: tobias.lenz@eui.eu.
The order of authors’ names reﬂects alphabetical convention; both authors have contributed equally to all work.
1 Anja Jetschke and Tobias Lenz, ‘Does regionalism diffuse? A new research agenda for the study of regional
organizations’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20:4 (2013), pp. 626–37.
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that diffusion matters for understanding a wide range of empirical phenomena in RIOs. In so doing,
they provide a welcome corrective to the tendency in the existing literature to view RIOs as driven
solely by endogenous – functionalist, intergovernmental, cultural, and other – factors.
Nevertheless, this research programme has yet to realise its full potential due to a major conceptual
limitation. There is a widespread tendency to think of diffusion as affecting only the ﬁnal design of
policies or institutional arrangements in RIOs. This has resulted in a truncated understanding of the
possible impact of diffusion across RIOs, and has promoted an unjustiﬁed view of convergence,
understood as a tendency towards increasing similarity in ﬁnal designs, as its primary outcome.2
This narrow focus in much of the literature is surprising for at least two reasons. First, it is
widely recognised that organisational decision-making processes, which are conceptualised as
interdependent in RIO diffusion studies, are not singular events but tend to consist of several phases
or stages.3 Second, many studies recognise empirically that adaptation of foreign models is a frequent
outcome of diffusion; full convergence is actually rather rare.4
In this article, we respond to Etel Solingen’s call to develop conceptual tools that ‘enable adequate
discrimination among different degrees of diffusion’5 by moving the conceptual focus towards the
decision-making process in the receiving organisations. We draw on the public policy literature
and organisational sociology research to identify three conceptually distinct and sequential
decision-making stages and leverage them to understand the creation of RIO policies and
institutions: problematisation, that is, the identiﬁcation of something as a political problem; framing,
or the categorisation of the problem and possible solutions; and scripting, that is, the design of ﬁnal
solutions. We contend that diffusion can affect any combination of these stages. It follows that its
effects are more varied than currently acknowledged. Convergence in ﬁnal design is just one possible
outcome; diffusion might also matter when we observe persistent variation in ﬁnal design.
We illustrate the usefulness of our framework in an empirical realm that has received much recent
scholarly attention: the creation of dispute settlement institutions – that is, institutions endowed with
the competence to adjudicate disputes and ensure the enforcement of legal commitments. We turn to
three RIOs: the European Economic Community (EEC), North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Our analysis suggests that
diffusion inﬂuenced the framing stage in the European Court of Justice, and both the pro-
blematisation and framing stages in NAFTA. In the case of SADC, diffusion affected all three stages –
with the EU providing the scripts for the ﬁnal stage, as already argued by Karen Alter, Tobias Lenz
(co-author of this article), and Onsando Osiemo.6 Convergence in outcome thus can only be seen in
2 See Jens Beckert, ‘Institutional isomorphism revisited: Convergence and divergence in institutional change’,
Sociological Theory, 28:2 (2010), pp. 150–66.
3 See, for example, James Anderson, Public Policymaking (New York: Praeger, 1975).
4 Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in
Asian regionalism’, International Organization, 58:2 (2004), pp. 239–75; Robyn Klingler-Vidra and Philip
Schleifer, ‘Convergence more or less: Why do practices vary as they diffuse?’, International Studies Review,
16:2 (2014), pp. 264–74; Tobias Lenz, ‘EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its
limits’, Cooperation and Conﬂict, 48:2 (2013), pp. 211–28.
5 Etel Solingen, ‘Of dominoes and ﬁrewalls: the domestic, regional, and global politics of international diffusion’,
International Studies Quarterly, 56:4 (2012), p. 632.
6 Karen J. Alter, ‘The global spread of European style international courts’,West European Politics, 35:1 (2012),
pp. 135–54; Karen J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2014); Tobias Lenz, ‘Spurred emulation: the EU and regional integration in
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the SADC case (with its adoption of the EU model), but this does not mean that diffusion did not
matter in the other cases. On the contrary, in those cases diffusion affected earlier stages of decision-
making and helped set the context for persistent variation in design later on.
Our conceptual approach has three important broader theoretical implications. First, it suggests
that diffusion, beyond being a force for convergence in ﬁnal designs, is also a force for
institutional or policy change more broadly. Especially if diffusion triggers the recognition of a
situation as a problem that requires political action (problematisation) and the way in
which the problem is understood (framing), it provides a strong impetus for departing from the
status quo. Diffusion accounts, then, challenge not only functional theories of institutional
design and public policymaking, but also variants of neo-institutionalist theories that predict
organisational stability. Second, our framework lends support to the view, rejected by most
mainstream diffusion theorists, that diffusion can matter even in situations in which ﬁnal designs
(models) are considered for adoption but ultimately rejected. Third, our approach offers a new
way of conceptualising the relationship between diffusion and domestic politics in generating
outcomes – two factors that are often seen as theoretical anti-theses, not least in the prominent
localisation debate. By replacing a narrow focus on ultimate outcomes with a disaggregated
view of the decision-making process in the receiving organisation, we come to appreciate that
diffusion and domestic politics can interact in sequential fashion and, together, affect ﬁnal
outcomes in RIOs.
The article proceeds in four parts. We begin with a brief overview of existing research on diffusion
among RIOs and outline its limitations. In Part II we propose our conceptual framework. In Part III
we illustrate it empirically through a structured comparison of the initial creation of dispute
settlement institutions of the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. Finally, we discuss the theoretical
implications of our framework, and propose two general conditions that seem to promote diffusion
in the three stages of decision-making.
I. Diffusion studies of regional international organisations:
Research programme and limitations
Diffusion denotes the process by which ideas, policies, institutions, and organisational activities
developed in one context affect political choices in another context in the absence of centralised
coordination or coercion. From this perspective, decision-making is interdependent, not indepen-
dent, across political settings; actors factor in choices made elsewhere as they weigh their options.7
In general, diffusion scholars take issue with the widespread if often implicit assumption that
Mercosur and SADC’, West European Politics, 35:1 (2012), pp. 155–74; Onsando Osiemo, ‘Lost in
translation: the role of African regional courts in regional integration in Africa’, Legal Issues of Economic
Integration, 41:1 (2014), pp. 87–122.
7 Zachary Elkins and Beth Simmons, ‘On waves, clusters, and diffusion: a conceptual framework’, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598 (2005), p. 35; see also Fabrizio Gilardi, ‘Transnational
diffusion: Norms, ideas and policies’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds),
Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2012), pp. 453–77. There is some disagreement in the
literature over whether centralised coordination and coercion should form part of the deﬁnition of diffusion.
We opt for a narrower deﬁnition of diffusion as a decentralised process to avoid using it as catch-all concept
for almost any form of outside inﬂuence. This also allows us to disaggregate it more easily into separate stages
that can be investigated with some precision.
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decisions in one political setting can be adequately understood in atomistic terms as unfolding in
isolation from developments in other settings.8
This theoretical perspective underpins an emerging research programme on diffusion among RIOs. Until
recently, scholars offered accounts of RIOs that focused almost exclusively on conditions and processes
internal to the relevant region. Those accounts are now being challenged. International political
economists argue, for example, that governments in one RIO craft trade agreements
conditional upon the existence of similar agreements elsewhere.9 Recent research examining the
language of regional trade agreements even shows that ‘most PTAs [preferential trade agreements] take
the overwhelming majority of their content verbatim from existing agreements’.10 There is a rapidly
growing literature on the diffusion to other regions of models inspired by the EU for international courts,
parliaments, and market integration agreements.11 Constructivists suggest that security and democracy
norms developed in Europe have travelled to regions across the global South.12 Policy analysts
furthermore show that speciﬁc policies in some RIOs, such as those concerning the regulation of trade or
labour rights, have served as templates for the creation of policies in other RIOs.13 Overall, these studies
8 See Detlef Jahn, ‘Globalization as “Galton’s Problem”: the missing link in the analysis of diffusion patterns in
welfare state development’, International Organization, 60:2 (2006), pp. 401–31.
9 Leonardo Baccini and Andreas Dür, ‘The new regionalism and policy interdependence’, British Journal of
Political Science, 42:1 (2012), pp. 57–79; Joseph Jupille, Brandy Joliff, and Stefan Wojcik, ‘Regionalism in the
World Polity’, Social Science Research Network (28 March 2013), available at: {http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2242500}; Edward Mansﬁeld and Helen Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of
International Trade Agreements (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Walter Mattli, The Logic of
Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
10 Todd Allee and Manfred Elsig, ‘Are the contents of international treaties copied-and-pasted? evidence from
preferential trade agreements’, paper presented at the 8th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of
International Organizations, Berlin, Germany, 12–14 February 2015, p. 3, emphasis added.
11 Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Osvaldo Saldías, ‘Transplanting the European Court of Justice: the
experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice’, American Journal of Comparative Law, 60:3 (2012), pp. 629–
64; Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘From Europeanization to diffusion: Introduction’, West European
Politics, 35:1 (2012), pp. 1–19; Tanja Börzel and Vera van Hüllen (eds), Governance Transfer by Regional
Organizations: Patching Together a Global Script (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Anja Jetschke,
‘Institutionalizing ASEAN: Celebrating Europe through network governance’, Cambridge Review of Inter-
national Affairs, 22:3 (2009), pp. 407–26; Clarissa F. Dri, ‘Limits of the institutional mimesis of the European
Union: the case of the Mercosur parliament’, Latin American Policy, 1:1 (2010), pp. 52–74; Jürgen Rüland and
Karsten Bechle, ‘Defending state-centric regionalism through mimicry and localization: Regional parliamentary
bodies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mercosur’, Journal of International
Relations and Development, 17:1 (2014), pp. 61–88.
12 Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’; Jean Grugel, ‘Democratization and ideational diffusion: Europe, Mercosur and
social citizenship’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45:1 (2007), pp. 43–68; Hiro Katsumata, ‘Mimetic
adoption and norm diffusion: “Western” security cooperation in Southeast Asia?’, Review of International
Studies, 37:2 (2011), pp. 557–76; Jürgen Rüland, ‘The limits of democratizing interest representation:
ASEAN’s regional corporatism and normative challenges’, European Journal of International Relations, 20:1
(2014), pp. 237–61.
13 Leonardo Baccini, Andreas Dür, and Yoram Haftel, ‘Imitation and innovation in international governance: the
diffusion of trade agreement design’, in Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig (eds), Trade Cooperation: The
Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), pp. 167–94; Francesco Duina, ‘Frames, scripts, and the making of regional trade agreements’, in Rawi
Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons (eds), Constructing the International Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2010), pp. 93–113; Anna van der Vleuten, Anouka van Eerdewijk, and Conny Roggeband
(eds), Gender Equality Norms in Regional Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). For an excellent
overview of this literature, see Thomas Risse, ‘The diffusion of regionalism, regional institutions, and regional
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have accumulated wide-ranging evidence that the impact of diffusion is ‘certainly not spurious’,14
and they suggest, more broadly, that our understanding of RIOs is incomplete unless we take processes
of diffusion into account.
Yet this emerging research programme still has to realise its full potential due to a major conceptual
weakness. It focuses almost exclusively on how ﬁnal designs of policies or institutional arrangements
travel between RIOs. This has led not only to a truncated understanding of the potential inﬂuence of
diffusion, but also to an unjustiﬁed view of convergence in ﬁnal designs as the primary outcome of
diffusion processes. Many diffusion studies take the adoption of a particular institutional form, such as a
regional trade agreement or a regional parliamentary body, as their dependent variable.15 When adoption
occurs, convergence in basic institutional features is the result. Yet even studies that move beyond a
binary conceptualisation of adoption display a similar tendency. Consider the following illustration.
In a recent study, Karen Alter demonstrated that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has shaped the
creation of dispute settlement institutions in other RIOs across the world.16 She documents the
existence of 11 ECJ copies, indicating ‘a revealed preference to emulate the ECJ’.17 Like their
European model, these courts distinguish themselves from conventional international courts through
their use of a supranational commission that monitors state compliance, a preliminary rulings
mechanism, and a system of administrative and constitutional review that provides for private
access.18 This is a striking ﬁnding given that the ECJ is ‘known for being activist and sovereignty
compromising’19 – a result that governments in most other countries would presumably prefer to
avoid. It is also theoretically important because it challenges established functional theories of
delegation to international dispute settlement institutions that depict them solely as rational
responses to structural conditions internal to the respective organisations.20
While Alter convincingly shows that diffusion matters for understanding the ﬁnal design of dispute
settlement institutions in many RIOs, two crucial questions about diffusion’s precise theoretical
signiﬁcance are difﬁcult to answer on the basis of her analysis. First, does her account suggest that, in
RIOs without a court modelled on the ECJ, diffusion from Europe did not matter at all? By focusing
strictly on ﬁnal design, Alter may have missed other types of diffusion effects. Second, is it justiﬁed to
assume that convergence can be the only result of – and evidence for – diffusion? Should we not look
for diffusion even when we observe continued variation in ﬁnal designs? Put differently, did Alter
miss other potentially relevant cases? Taken together, these questions suggest that the existing
scholarship on RIOs at once may be underestimating the role of diffusion (to the extent that it
operates at stages other than ﬁnal design) and, when evidence in its favour is found when it comes to
governance’, in Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
14 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘When Europeanisation meets diffusion: Exploring new territory’, West
European Politics, 35:1 (2012), p. 194.
15 Baccini and Dür, ‘New regionalism and policy interdependence’; Mattli, ‘Logic of regional integration’; Anja
Jetschke and Philomena Murray, ‘Diffusing regional integration: the EU and Southeast Asia’, West European
Politics, 35:1 (2012), pp. 174–91.
16 Alter, ‘The global spread of European style international courts’.
17 Ibid., p. 145.
18 See Alter, The New Terrain of International Law.
19 Ibid., p. 90.
20 See, for example, James McCall Smith, ‘The politics of dispute settlement design: Legalism in regional trade
pacts’, International Organization, 54:1 (2000), pp. 137–80.
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ﬁnal designs, may be attributing to it too much importance (given that it is then generally seen as one,
if not the major, explanatory variable) – as, indeed, a number of scholars have started to suspect.21
An important next step, then, is to expand the research focus so as to include but go beyond ﬁnal
design. This requires, we believe, a more nuanced view of the decision-making process underlying the
adoption of ﬁnal designs. Below, we turn to the literature on public policy and organisational
sociology to elaborate a coherent conceptual framework around this idea.
II. Diffusion and stages of decision-making: a conceptual framework
Our framework starts from a conceptualisation of diffusion that has become widely accepted in
contemporary research: it is best seen as a process, not an outcome, characterised by interdependent
and decentralised decision-making across units of analysis, be they states or international
organisations.22 Whereas recent work on diffusion has focused on dissecting the transfer process
from one political setting to another with a focus on ﬁnal designs,23 we propose to disaggregate the
decision-making process in the receiving organisation. We thus view the potential impact of diffusion
as more extensive than is depicted in current research. Our speciﬁc focus is on diffusion across legally
distinct RIOs, be they in different geographical areas or overlapping ones, and in place at the same
point or different points in time.
We propose that organisational decision-making encompasses three analytically distinct and
sequential stages. First, actors identify a problem as requiring political action – what we term
problematisation. Second, actors categorise this problem and the types of possible solutions –
what we call framing. Third, actors generate speciﬁc policy and institutional solutions within the
articulated frame – we refer to this as scripting (this is the step of typical interest in the existing
scholarship with its focus on ﬁnal design).24 Each of these stages follows distinct dynamics and
is potentially inﬂuenced by different causal factors, providing the rationale for treating them as
conceptually distinct.25 To be sure, as the case studies below also indicate, the boundaries between
these stages are not always easy to draw in empirical analysis. Problematisation and framing or
framing and scripting sometimes go hand in hand, indicating that choices across the three stages may
feed into one another. Problematising an issue in a certain way tends to open up a certain universe of
frames. Similarly, selecting certain frames over others renders the choice for certain scripts more
likely. In short, decisions at an earlier stage may affect decisions at later ones – in line with the
expectations of path dependence theorists.26 Our point, however, is precisely to propose, and then to
21 Acharya, ‘How ideas spread’, p. 241; Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer, ‘Convergence more or less’, p. 264.
22 Elkins and Simmons , ‘On waves, clusters and diffusion’, pp. 35–6; Gilardi, ‘Transnational diffusion’.
23 Solingen, ‘Of dominoes and ﬁrewalls’; Etel Solingen and Tanja Börzel, ‘Introduction to presidential issue: the
politics of international diffusion – a symposium’, International Studies Review, 16:2 (2014), pp. 173–87.
24 This three-fold division is akin to the distinction between institutional change, institutional choice, and
institutional design in recent works on institutions that use rational choice theory. See Joseph Jupille, Walter
Mattli, and Duncan Snidal (eds), Instititional Choice and Global Commerce (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, ‘The rational design of
international institutions’, International Organization, 54:4 (2001), pp. 761–99.
25 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984), p. 3; See also
Herbert Simon, ‘Political research: the decision-making framework’, in David Easton (ed.), Varieties of
Political Theory (Englewood Cliff: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 15–24.
26 See, for example, Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004), ch. 1.
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show empirically, that actors can in fact make de novo choices across these stages – and that
diffusion can be a powerful force at each of them. Thus, whereas one model might serve as the basis
for framing a decision, a different model might inspire scripting. Decisions at one stage do not fully
determine decisions at later ones. At each stage, actors have considerable freedom over how, exactly,
they respond to decisions taken at earlier stages.
Diffusion across RIOs, therefore, can affect any one of these decision-making stages independently and
in any combination, including the possibility that it does not affect any of them at all (for example
when policymakers in one RIO are unaware of, or simply ignore or reject, the problems, frames, and
scripts adopted in other RIOs). Diffusion can thus not only affect scripting, as much recent diffusion
research suggests, but also problematisation and framing. We depict our conceptual framework in
Figure 1. Below, we explicate each of the three decision-making stages and how diffusion can operate in
each. Empirical illustrations are drawn from work on RIOs and dispute settlement.
Problematisation
Sociologists and other scholars of organisations have recognised for some time that ‘problems’ do not
simply exist in the world but are in fact crafted through cognitive and societal processes.27 Departing
from functionalist understandings of organisational structures and practices as reﬂecting ‘objective’
problems, they suggest that actors in organisations construct problems. As John Kingdon notes, pro-
blems are ‘not entirely self-evident. How people deﬁne something as a problem is worth some con-
sideration.’28 Many ‘objective’ problems do not trigger political action because they are not perceived as
problems, or because no solution is readily available. Indeed, the poor functioning of many regional
economic organisations is a ‘real’ problem with surprisingly little political consequence.29 Many of these
organisations persist as ill-functioning for years and even decades without attempts to change the
situation. From this perspective, problematisation is the ‘process by which given social conditions or
Policies and Institutional Arrangements
NoYesDiffusion
Decision-making
Stage 1
Problematis ation
Stage 2
Framing
Stage 3
Scripting
YesYes NoNo
Figure 1. Diffusion and stages of decision-making.
27 Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, ‘A garbage can model of organizational choice’,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17:1 (1972), p. 125; Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio (eds), The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Malcolm Spector
and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001).
28 Kingdon, Agendas, p. 95.
29 See Julia Gray and Jonathan Slapin, ‘How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts’, Review
of International Organizations, 7:3 (2012), pp. 309–33.
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arrangements come to be recognized as social problems’,30 that is, problems that require political action.
It is the ﬁrst step toward the creation of new policies and institutional arrangements.
How does something become a problem? Scholars of organisations at times point to causal variables
that are internal to an organisation. Social constructivists posit that actors subscribe to particular
normative viewpoints about the world that they use to problematise challenges, dysfunctions,
strains, or suboptimal outcomes that may emerge from within the organisation.31 Moreover, the
resources, expertise, and ‘institutional logics’ an organisation is endowed with bias what types of
occurrences are characterised as problems.32 Regarding dispute settlement, problematisation might
result from an endogenous learning process whereby actors become dissatisﬁed with current
arrangements. For example, in Mercosur the ‘reform of the DSS [dispute settlement system] was
placed on the agenda as a result of perceived problems with the institutional status quo’ due to
defeats of the two larger member states Argentina and Brazil in dispute settlement.33
The sources of problematisation, however, can also be external to the organisation. A crisis in a speciﬁc
cultural and social context might spark problematisation and thus organisational change. Policymakers
in Europe, for instance, ‘viewed Hitler’s extermination policy as exposing a limitation of international
law’ that required determined political action in a context in which a ‘strong … norm supporting
international and global judicial bodies’ already existed.34 The absence of a robust European human
rights system thus became problematised, and ultimately led to the creation of the European Court of
Human Rights in 1953. But, more pertinently for our purposes, scholars of policy learning and policy
transfer have long recognised that ‘problems’ can travel between organisations.35 Similarly, students of
organisations contend that organisations are embedded in organisational ﬁelds, and that interaction
density, structure, and degree of consolidation generate pressures for institutional isomorphism.36
In this vein, we suggest that the recognition in one RIO of a problem as politically relevant can be the
result of its construction in another RIO. Regional dispute settlement serves as a pertinent example.
During the 1960s and 1970s, few regional integration projects entailed strong dispute settlement
mechanisms because no link had been established between dispute settlement and the success of
30 Herbert Blumer, ‘Social problems as collective behavior’, Social Problems, 18:3 (1971), p. 302, emphasis?
added.
31 Darin Weinberg, ‘On the social construction of social problems and social problems theory: a contribution to the
legacy of John Kitsuse’, American Sociologist, 40:1/2 (2009), pp. 61–78; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore,
Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
32 William Ocasio, ‘The enactment of economic adversity: a reconciliation of theories of failure-induced change
and threat-rigidity’, Research in Organizational Behavior, 17 (1995), pp. 287–331; William Ocasio, ‘Toward
an attention-based view of the ﬁrm’, Strategic Management Journal, 18:S1 (1997), pp. 187–206.
33 Christian Arnold and Berthold Rittberger, ‘The legalization of dispute resolution in Mercosur’, Journal of
Politics in Latin America, 5:3 (2013), p. 115.
34 Suzanne Katzenstein, ‘In the shadow of crisis: the creation of international courts in the twentieth century’,
Harvard Journal of International Law, 55:1 (2014), pp. 188, 165.
35 William E. Paterson and James Sloan, ‘Learning from the West: Policy transfer and political parties’, Journal of
Communist Studies & Transition Politics, 21:1 (2005), pp. 33–47; Peter A. Hall, ‘Policy paradigms, social
learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, 25:3 (1993),
pp. 275–96.
36 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective ration-
ality in organizational ﬁelds’, American Sociological Review, 48:2 (1983), p. 148; John Meyer and Brian
Rowan, ‘Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony’, American Journal of
Sociology, 83:2 (1977), pp. 340–63.
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regional integration. As this changed due to the EU experience in the 1970s, the absence of
supranational dispute settlement systems in other RIOs began to be seen as a problem.37
When policymakers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, for example, started discussion
of the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in the early 1990s, experts quickly pointed to
the EU and other RIO’s experience in arguing that this undertaking is likely to fail in the absence of
more solid institutions to ensure implementation38 – an argument that eventually convinced pol-
icymakers. The problem of dispute settlement had diffused to ASEAN from the outside.
Framing
Once actors come to agree that a problem requires political action, they start thinking about ways of
tackling it. As they do, they operate with certain ‘frames’ in mind.39 According to research on
organisational action, social movements, and policy learning,40 frames can be deﬁned as ‘collectively
shared and accepted ways of interpreting situations and problems’.41 Frames include basic schemas,
categories, causal pathways, and other cognitive tools. As such, frames are not the answers to the
problem but, rather, the basic cognitive tools with which actors ﬁrst categorise problems and
then consider certain tools to solve them – what Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore term
‘classiﬁcation’.42 By allowing actors to understand problems and to conceive of certain solutions,
frames logically exclude alternative interpretations and solutions. We may say that they channel
actors’ cognitive abilities and efforts.
Categorisation involves the assignment of labels to a perceived problem. A perceived violation
of a supranational legal commitment, for instance, may be described as a ‘failure of implementation’
that has the potential to seriously undermine the credibility of regional integration more broadly.
Such categorisation allows actors to make sense of a problem – to give it essential traits and
characteristics – and thus to render it amenable to certain kinds of solutions and not others. The
identiﬁcation of possible types of interventions therefore follows categorisation. Certain problems, in
other words, call for certain kinds of solutions and not others.43 To return to our example, by
classifying a legal violation as an instance of implementation failure, policymakers interpret it as part of
a general and therefore potentially much larger problem that requires a solution appropriate to the
problem at hand: an ad hoc remedial measure might not sufﬁce, a systematic institutional solution is
called for.
37 Alter, Helfer, and Saldías, ‘Transplanting the European Court of Justice’, pp. 629–32.
38 Jacques Pelkmans, ‘Asean’s institutional requirements with special reference to Afta’, in Pearl Imada and
Seiji Naya (eds), Afta: The Way Ahead (Singepore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), pp. 126–9;
Rolf Langhammer, ‘What can Asean learn from the experience of European integration? An EU perspective’, in
Siow Yue Chia and Joseph Tan (eds), Asean & EU: Forging New Linkages and Strategic Alliances (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 234–56.
39 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements: an overview and
assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), pp. 611–39.
40 Ellen Reese and Garnett Newcombe, ‘Income rights, mothers’ rights, or workers’ rights? Collective action
frames, organizational ideologies, and the American Welfare Rights Movement’, Social Problems, 50:2 (2003),
pp. 294–318; David Snow and Robert Benford, ‘Master frames and cycles of protest’, in Aldon D. Morris and
Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), pp. 133–55.
41 Duina, ‘Frames, scripts, and the making of regional trade agreements’, p. 100.
42 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, pp. 31–2.
43 Jackie Smith, ‘Bridging global divides?’, International Sociology, 17:4 (2002), pp. 505–28.
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Where do frames come from? Social movement scholars note that frames are often available in
society, as part of the proximate cultural environment in which actors operate.44 Actors appropriate
frames from their environment and use them to look at the problem at hand. The proposed solutions
resonate with those actors and those around them. It would make little sense if matters were
otherwise: frames that do not ﬁt a particular cultural context have little chance of guiding actors
towards solutions that will be appreciated and understood because they contain ‘cultural repertoires’
that make action intelligible.45 These insights are relevant for RIOs. Actors in those organisations
operate in national or international cultural contexts rich with frames. For example, domestic legal
systems contain manifold taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of legal problems and
adequate solutions that are likely to shape international negotiators’ preferences. In this vein,
Francesco Duina (co-author of this article) demonstrates a striking correspondence between the legal
traditions of member states – common law vs civil law – and the nature of dispute settlement
mechanisms in regional trade agreements.46
However, we propose that frames can also come from other RIOs; frames diffuse between
organisations. This can happen in multiple ways. For one, actors in one setting are inevitably bound
to search for proven and appropriate frames by looking at what other RIOs are doing. They actively
consult and examine those organisations. A second way is through more passive exposure: some
frame used by one or more RIO may have acquired broad recognition already. A third path
of diffusion is the active promotion (through training programmes, published materials, conferences,
etc.) on the part of one RIO of its frames for adoption by others. Such promotion can be further
supported by backing from external actors such as politicians and experts in epistemic communities.
It follows that the RIO that serves as the ‘provider’ of frames need not have been involved in
problematisation; the two decision-making stages can be treated as independent. For instance,
internal dynamics or exogenous crises may be responsible for problematisation; once in place, the
problem requires attention and organisational actors may then start looking beyond their conﬁnes
for inspiration or, in a more passive fashion, may have already internalised dominant frames in their
organisational ﬁelds. According to Alter et al., the idea of separate decision-making stages captures
the process of the creation of the Andean Tribunal of Justice. Problematisation had internal roots,
with the practice of enacting secondary legislation by presidential decree without parliamentary
approval leading policymakers to view the Andean legal system as requiring political reform. Yet,
framing was signiﬁcantly affected by diffusion. Once policymakers began to search for potential
solutions, the problem was framed in terms of a lack of a supranational judicial review mechanism
that could ‘[provide] a designated judicial body for challenging Andean law’, a categorizstion that, in
turn, inadvertently led policymakers to view the ‘the necessity to create a court’ for the region.47 This
frame had diffused from Europe to legal experts in the region via socialisation and emulation
44 John Boli and George M. Thomas, ‘Introduction’, in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds), Constructing
World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1999), p. 4; Sidney Tarrow, ‘Mentalities, political cultures, and collective action frames: Constructing
meanings through action’, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement
Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 174–202.
45 Mayer Zald, ‘Culture, ideology, and strategic framing’, in Dough McAdam, JohnMacCarthy, and Mayer Zald
(eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
pp. 261–74.
46 Francesco Duina, ‘Making sense of the legal and judicial architectures of regional trade agreements
worldwide’, Regulation and Governance, doi: 10.1111/rego.12081.
47 Alter, Helfer, and Saldias, ‘Transplanting the European Court of Justice’, p. 643.
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processes. While the ‘question of what type of court [to establish] remained open’,48 that is, scripting
had yet to be decided, the speciﬁc framing of the problem as requiring further supranational legal
integration excluded alternative interpretations and other potential solutions, such as changing
domestic constitutional provisions or involving national parliaments in the adoption of Andean
secondary legislation.
Scripting
Once actors have categorised the problem and thereby preﬁgured potential solutions, they set out to
devise new policies and institutional arrangements. This ﬁnal stage requires detailing the speciﬁc
features that create an institution or policy. For example, how should a dispute settlement institution
be composed? What speciﬁc competences should it have? And should its decisions be binding on
member states? Following the terminology of world polity theory, we refer to this stage as the
production of scripts, or scripting.49 RIO actors utilise scripts, or existing models, as building
blocks for the ﬁnal design of a new policy or institution. Sometimes, single scripts serve as
ready-made templates for the design of policies and institutions; at other times, policies and insti-
tutions are patched together from different scripts.50 For example, the Mercosur dispute settlement
mechanism combines elements from the World Trade Organization as well as from the European
Court of Justice.51 And as we elaborate further below, even when speciﬁc templates are adopted,
they are usually adapted to local conditions. As already noted, this is the stage of the decision-
making process upon which scholars of diffusion across RIOs have thus far focused almost
exclusively.
The key question for us concerns the origins of those scripts. How do RIO actors produce them?
Research suggests that RIO actors refer to the broader environment for inspiration. National
governments, with their legal systems and extensive administrative structures, are signiﬁcant
producers and depositories of scripts on a large variety of topics.52 These are accessible and,
depending on the issues on hand, RIO policymakers certainly consult them for insights. Much of the
same can be said of the policy platforms on national political parties. Some domestic pressure groups
make it their mission to provide ready-made policies for international organisations to adopt. They
promote their work by publishing them on their websites or other media venues. As we demonstrate
in the European case below, many of the design features of the European Court of Justice had their
origin in German and Italian models.
At the same time, according to sociologists, international organisations themselves are also
very important sources of scripts.53 These include transnational corporations, international
industry-oriented bodies (such as the International Standards Organization, International
Accounting Standards Committee, and World Health Organization), international development-
oriented organisations (the OECD or World Bank, for example), and international lobbying and
48 Ibid.
49 Duina, ‘Frames, scripts, and the making of regional trade agreements’, p. 100.
50 Börzel and van Hüllen (eds), Governance Transfer by Regional Organizations.
51 Lenz, ‘Spurred emulation’, p. 168; Arnold and Rittberger, ‘The legalization of dispute resolution in Mercosur’,
p. 122.
52 David John Frank, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Schofer, ‘The nation-state and the natural environment over the
twentieth century’, American Sociological Review, 65:1 (2000), pp. 96–116.
53 Boli and Thomas, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1–10.
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interest groups.54 The scripts originating from one international organisation are easily accessible by
actors in other international organisations. In many cases, they are actively promoted to those
actors.55 Consider, as an example, the IMF’s recommended minimum deposit rules for personal
accounts with international banks.
Along with existing scholarship on ﬁnal design in RIOs, we posit that RIOs are important sources of
scripts. Scripts diffuse, in other words, across legally distinct RIOs. The mechanisms of diffusion are
once again varied. Ofﬁcials in one RIO can turn to another RIO for inspiration. They may as well
come under pressure (internally and externally) to adopt scripts that have proven successful in
another RIO. The originating RIO may, for instance, offer ﬁnancial compensation for adoption, or
require it as a condition for something else to happen (a trade agreement between the two blocs, for
instance). Powerful groups (consumer organisations, special interest associations, etc.) may also
pressure ofﬁcials in one RIO to follow the examples set by an ofﬁcial in another RIO. Expediency
may of course also play a role: ready-made solutions are attractive in their own right. Karen Alter, in
the piece discussed above, demonstrates that the European Court of Justice script has been widely
adopted, sometimes with modiﬁcations, across RIOs in the global South.
Importantly, we should note that such diffusion of scripts can happen independently from that of
frames or problems. As with frames, scripts may or may not come from the same sources that
provided the problematisation of something. They may also not come from the source of the relevant
frames being utilised. Indeed, because they are rather concrete and explicitly articulated, scripts can
be easily ‘found’ anywhere in world society and borrowed, irrespective of the prior work that has
been done on a problem. Thus it is important to keep in mind that RIOs are only one of the many
types of sources for scripts. The World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, have for instance served as inﬂuential sources of scripts for dispute
settlement design in RIOs.
Diffusion and persistent variation
As already noted, much of the existing literature shares an implicit understanding of diffusion as the
transfer of models across RIOs, even if they are synthesised in creative ways. As a result, scholarship
to date has inextricably linked diffusion with convergence, or even homogenisation, understood as a
tendency of ‘receiving’ RIOs to become more similar to, or even alike, ‘sending’ RIOs in ﬁnal
designs.56 Yet, if diffusion affects only problematisation and/or framing while innovation occurs in
scripting, scriptural convergence does not take place; sending and receiving RIOs continue to display
variation in this respect. Given the existing literature’s focus on ﬁnal designs, we refer to convergence
only if diffusion affects the scripting stage, whereas we speak of persistent variation between sending
and receiving RIO when diffusion effects are conﬁned to problematisation and/or framing. Our main
54 Francesco Duina and Peter Nedergaard, ‘Learning in international governmental organizations: the case of
social protection’, Global Social Policy, 10:2 (2010), pp. 193–217.
55 Martha Finnemore, ‘International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entiﬁc, and Cultural Organization and science policy’, International Organization, 47:4 (1993), pp. 565–97.
56 This is not to deny that some scholars, especially those interested in localisation processes, tend to frame their
inquiries into diffusion in terms of translation and adaptation rather than convergence. This rhetorical move
notwithstanding, these scholars are hard-pressed to deny that if diffusion takes place, even when transferred
models are extensively adjusted to ﬁt local conditions, this increases similarity between the respective units in
ﬁnal designs when compared to the status quo antes, and therefore can be labelled a form of convergence.
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argument is, therefore, that diffusion may be happening even when we observe persistent variation.
As mentioned before, while scholars do recognise this empirically, we provide a coherent framework
to ground these observations conceptually. We now have a more nuanced conceptual perspective on
how diffusion can operate across RIOs, which allows us to improve upon the tendency to equate
diffusion with convergence in ﬁnal designs.
III. Illustrations: Dispute settlement institutions in RIOs
In this section, we illustrate our conceptual framework with a structured comparison of the creation of
regional dispute settlement institutions in three RIOs: the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. Based on
existing secondary literature and our own research, we re-examine the decision-making episodes that
led to the initial creation of such a body in the respective organisations with a view to discerning the
role of diffusion at each stage.57 We are interested in diffusion between RIOs, understood as
transfers between distinct legal entities established by formal contracts between neighbouring
countries.
We selected these case studies for several reasons. First, we wanted to illustrate the two central
conceptual points in our argument: diffusion can generate a variety of effects along the
decision-making process, operating not only at the ﬁnal design (scripting) but also at the pro-
blematisation and framing stages; and diffusion might play a role in decision-making even if con-
vergence in ﬁnal designs is not the outcome, which means that persistent variation is another
potential outcome of diffusion processes. The three RIOs offer compelling evidence on these points.
Second, the three case studies reﬂect distinct periods in the evolution of the international judiciary –
the EEC in the post-Second World War era, NAFTA during the transition period at the end of the
Cold War, and SADC in the post-Cold War era. This highlights the broad applicability of our
framework.
Third, two of our case studies (the EEC and NAFTA) illustrate especially well how persistent
variation can result even in circumstances where there would be strong reasons to expect diffusion in
all three stages. As we shall see, there was within each region (Western Europe and North American)
a preexisting – though legally distinct – RIO which could have served as a convenient basis for the
design of dispute resolution mechanisms. As path dependence and simple logic would lead us to
expect, there certainly was some diffusion from those earlier RIOs – a high degree of co-membership,
in our view, is certainly a condition conducive to diffusion, an issue we will come back to in the
conclusion. But the fact that diffusion did not happen in all stages, and variation in ﬁnal designs
occurred in these two RIOs, is remarkable and instructive.
Our focus is on RIO-to-RIO diffusion. This means we do not examine in detail other sources of
diffusion such as global organisations as well as potential second- or third-order diffusion effects that
are ‘the product of sedimentation of prior and historically more remote diffusion’.58 We of course
acknowledge those sources as important. The fact that dispute settlement mechanisms have
57 Some of these bodies changed subsequently. SADC, for example, later created a second dispute settlement
mechanism in the context of the SADC Trade Protocol, and it disbanded the SADC Tribunal in 2012 following
a controversial ruling against the Zimbabwian government. For an extended discussion of the latter, see Karen
Alter, James Thuo Gathii, and Laurence Helfer, ‘Backlash against international courts in West, East and South
Africa: Causes and consequences’, iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 21 (2015).
58 Solingen, ‘Of dominoes and ﬁrewalls’, p. 633.
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become very common in international organisations59 has certainly inﬂuenced policymakers in
many RIOs. We recognise this but then aim to trace, to the best possible extent, diffusion
across RIOs.
Our ﬁndings, in brief, are these. In all three instances diffusion mattered. Yet, it did so very
differently in each case. Existing research argues that the scripts that deﬁne SADC’s dispute
settlement institutions came from the EU.60 We concur with this view: the permanent and centralised
dispute adjudication of the EU indeed found its way into SADC. Scholars have instead considered
NAFTA (with its non-permanent and decentralised mechanism) and the EU itself as innovators: they
built new mechanisms. As such, scholars have shown little interest in diffusion as a possible causal
factor. In fact, we suggest that diffusion inﬂuenced the framing of potential solutions in the case of
the European Court of Justice, and that it affected both the problematisation and framing of dispute
settlement in NAFTA. Indeed, in both cases, the ‘originating’ RIOs were in those two very regions
respectively – but have been overlooked because of the assumption that lack of convergence means
lack of diffusion. When it comes to SADC, moreover, diffusion certainly inﬂuenced scripts but also
the steps of problematisation and framing – something that has until now been overlooked.
We summarise our discussion in Table 1.
Thus, diffusion mattered in all three cases, even when ﬁnal institutional design varied. Importantly,
diffusion was partial precisely in the two case studies – EEC and NAFTA – where we would have
expected it to be wholesale (since these two RIOs were created in areas where earlier, though legally
distinct, RIOs were in place).
European Economic Community
The EEC, and later the European Union, is typically considered the source of diffusion for other
RIOs and rarely the receiver. This is especially so in the case of its European Court of Justice, which
was created in 1958 with the two Treaties of Rome – the EEC and the European Atomic Energy
Community. Without question, the European Court of Justice has inﬂuenced the creation of courts in
numerous RIOs. What is often not considered, however, is whether other RIO courts have shaped
the European Court of Justice itself. A close examination of the historical record shows that diffusion
happened at one juncture in particular: framing. The source was an RIO in Europe itself: the
European Coal and Steel Community and its Court of Justice (the ECSC-CJ). Indeed, the ECSC-CJ,
and not the European Court of Justice, should be considered perhaps the ﬁrst and most original of
the modern RIO courts.
A few clariﬁcations about the ECSC-CJ are in order. It was not part of the original plans for the
Treaty of Paris of 1951, which established the European Coal and Steel Community.61 It emerged as
a possibility after the member states became concerned with questions of legal remedies and of the
balancing the powers of the supranational European Coal and Steel Community High Authority
59 Barbara Koremenos and Timm Betz, ‘The design of dispute settlement procedures in international agreements’,
in Jeffrey A. Dunnoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds), International Law and International Relations: Synthesizing
Insights from Interdisciplinary Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 371–93.
60 Alter, ‘The global spread of European style international courts’; Alter, The New Terrain of International Law;
Tobias Lenz, ‘Spurred emulation’; Osiemo, ‘Lost in translation’.
61 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Dordecht: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 1986), p. 207.
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with the interests of national governments. A committee of jurists was given the mandate to make
proposals. France opposed any permanent court, but the Benelux countries and Germany favoured
it – albeit for different reasons.62 Once the decision was made to have a court, intense negotiations
ensued. The evidence points to inspiration coming from ‘traditional-continental European types of
administrative courts’,63 and, in particular, France’s Conseil d’Etat, though its design ultimately
‘deﬁed easy categorisation’.64 The ESCS-CJ was accordingly designed without other RIO
courts in mind, though it belonged to a postwar period during which new transnational courts of
justices were being created (for instance, the Nuremberg Court and the European Court of
Human Rights).
These developments inﬂuenced the European Court of Justice. In the early 1950s, the six European
Coal and Steel Community members began contemplating integration efforts for their national
economies and the production of atomic energy. While negotiating the treaties for the EEC and the
European Atomic Energy Community (two new and legally distinct RIOs), ‘it was by no means clear
how the institutional structure of the two communities would look and whether it would include a
Court’.65 Indeed, uncertainties about the need for a court featured in parallel discussions by feder-
alists, such as the European Movement led by Paul Henri Spaak and other Europeans exploring a
variety of futures for a united Europe (including a European Political Community, which could have
had a need for a court).66
A new problem thus presented itself: did the process of adding two new RIOs in Europe necessitate
the creation of new and shared supranational institutions? A fundamental disagreement was at the
root of the question. In a sort of turnaround from its position during the European Coal and Steel
Community creation, the French delegation to the Venice negotiations in May of 1956 made it clear
Table 1. Diffusion and decision-making stages in three RIOs.
EU NAFTA SADC
Institutional
arrangement
European Court of Justice
(1958): permanent,
centralised dispute
adjudication
Dispute settlement mechanism for
investments (1994): non-permanent,
decentralised dispute adjudication
SADC Tribunal
(2000): permanent
centralised dispute
adjudication
Inﬂuence of RIO
diffusion on:
Problematisation No Yes Yes
Framing Yes Yes Yes
Scripting No No Yes
Institutional design
outcome
Persistent variation Persistent variation Convergence
62 Anne Boerger-De Smet, ‘Negotiating the foundations of European law, 1950–57: the legal history of the
treaties of Paris and Rome’, Contemporary European History, 21:3 (2012), pp. 342–43.
63 Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, p. 208.
64 Boerger-De Smet, ‘Negotiating the foundations of European law’, p. 346.
65 Hjalte Rasmussen, ‘The origins of a legal revolution: the early history of the European Court of Justice’,
Journal of European Integration History, 14:2 (2008), p. 86.
66 Ibid., p. 80.
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that it ‘could not support a connection between the ECSC court and the two projected
Communities’.67 France was opposed to a strong supranational judiciary capable of acting inde-
pendently of national interests. But the other member states thought that the creation of the
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community called for an inte-
grated legal system (inclusive of the European Coal and Steel Community) and shared institutions,
including a court. The challenge of building three parallel RIOs thus served as grounds for the
problematisation of the need for a possible court. In the language of this article, the ﬁrst step of the
process was therefore an internal matter: it had to do with the institutional logic of creating
three RIOs.
There followed considerable debate over how best to proceed. Negotiators began categorising the
problem they faced and identifying a set of possible solutions – they began framing the issues on
hand. The available evidence suggests that at this moment the ECSC-CJ became an important
reference point (much as it had in the earlier discussions surrounding the European Political
Community).68 Ofﬁcials from all the member states but France reasoned that the EEC by virtue of its
extensive legal framework would inevitably face a judicial problem similar to the one experienced by
the European Coal and Steel Community, and that accordingly an independent permanent court
analogous in general terms to the ECSC-CJ would be the appropriate type of solution.69 Equally
important, given that the European Coal and Steel Community would constitute one of the three
RIOs in question, the judicial question would also involve the ECSC and, for the sake of institutional
unity and coherence, should be dealt with by a single judicial body. The problem was therefore
deemed to be judicial in nature, and the solution would also be the same. Thus, a network of
pro-European jurists, including ESCS-ECJ General Advocate Maurice Lagrange, argued that
‘[ESCS-] ECJ jurisprudence laid the foundations for a genuinely European legal order on which a
future Federal Court could base itself.’70 But the French government (along with some prominent
politicians from other countries, such as the German Ministry of Economics) disagreed, and
proposed that the solution be more ‘technical’ in nature: a Court of Arbitrage made up of a
secretariat and ad hoc technical experts could sufﬁce, given that only a few disputes would arise.71
The ECSC-CJ, for the French, was not an appropriate reference. The lack of consensus around
solutions meant that the court was eventually removed from the agenda in late 1956, only to
reappear at later rounds in the negotiations.72
After securing important economic concessions, the French relented and the idea of a permanent
court of justice was accepted.73 The time had thus come to deﬁne its design – the scripting phase
began. Here, if the ECSC-CJ was inspirational in the framing phase, it played a signiﬁcantly lesser
role in this third step. Now ofﬁcials had to deal with three RIOs and the objectives and aspirations
in question had considerably expanded.74 A more powerful court, effectively dealing with
constitutional tasks – that is, with the ability ‘to invalidate statutes and other acts of public authority
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Boerger-De Smet, ‘Negotiating the foundations of European law’, p. 349.
70 Rasmussen, ‘The origins of a legal revolution’, p. 82.
71 Ibid., p. 87.
72 Boerger-De Smet, ‘Negotiating the foundations of European law’, p. 349.
73 Ibid.
74 Ditlev Tamm, ‘The history of the Court of Justice of the European Union since its origin’, in Allan Rosas,
Egils Levits, and Yves Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and
Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2013), p. 16.
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found to be in conﬂict with a constitution’75 – was envisioned, and ofﬁcials had to reach for new
ideas and tools. As a group, key historical accounts, such as Anne Boerger-De Smet’s,76 depict the
jurists charged with deﬁning the court as operating with considerable freedom and independence and
turned, at least for some inspiration, to the national models (the Italian and German especially).77
The most important innovation was endowing the new European Court of Justice with the power to
hear preliminary references from national courts concerning the validity of domestic law and, with
that, the unprecedented ability to interpret European law and issue preliminary rulings.78 This could
in principle ensure uniform understanding throughout the Community79 and would eventually have
major implications for the activities of the court. The European Court of Justice was also given
powers to review the legality of acts by the Council and the Commission. Article 4, in turn,
strengthened the standing of the court by stating that it should be considered equal to the other
major institutions of the Community.80
All this set the new European Court of Justice quite apart from the ECSC-CJ. A new sort of
Community court had been created – one that would inﬂuence dispute settlement institutions in
many other RIOs in the coming decades.
North American Free Trade Agreement
We consider here the highly used dispute settlement mechanism81 for foreign investments laid out in
Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Rather than a permanent court or other institutionalised body, Chapter 11
speciﬁes guidelines for hoc tribunals capable of issuing binding decisions related to discrimination,
uncompensated expropriation, and treatment inconsistent with international law by member states
vis-à-vis foreign investors. In terms of scripts, Chapter 11 owed little to any other RIO and was
‘revolutionary’ or at the very least quite innovative in several respects.82 Yet, other RIOs certainly
inﬂuenced the earlier stages of the process. As with the European Court of Justice, then, this case
highlights how diffusion across RIOs can happen in the earlier phases of institutional design but be
far less relevant in the ﬁnal step, even in cases where the new RIOs supersede preexisting ones in the
same spaces (and with the same membership).
What, then, prompted the problematisation of investor rights among the NAFTA negotiators?
Several factors played a role. Some were certainly endogenous to the region. North America as a
whole during the 1980s had become a major destination of foreign direct investment, with ﬂows
75 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in Paul Craig and Grainne De Burca (eds), The Evolution of
EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 122.
76 Boerger-De Smet, ‘Negotiating the foundations of European law’, p. 351.
77 Ibid.
78 Article 177; Martin Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics:
Politics and Policymaking in the ‘New’ European Community (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1992), p. 126.
79 Tamm, ‘The history of the Court of Justice, pp. 19–20.
80 The Commission, Assembly (later Parliament), and Council.
81 For a list of cases, see {http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
disp-diff/nafta.aspx} accessed 5 September 2015.
82 Patrick Dumberry, ‘The NAFTA investment dispute settlement mechanism: a review of the latest case-law’, The
Journal of World Investment, 2:1 (2001), p. 151; Kristin L. Oelstrom, ‘A treaty for the future: the dispute
settlement mechanisms of the NAFTA’, Law and Policy in International Business, 25 (1993), p. 799.
Regionalism and diffusion revisited
789
among the three member states increasing in every direction (except for Canadian investments into
Mexico).83 The United States was accordingly interested in more secure access to Mexico.
But exogenous factors also played a role. Some of these were not RIOs. The United States was
already a participant in numerous bilateral investment treaties,84 and these as a rule had for a long
time guaranteed various sorts of investor protections.85 During the GATT Uruguay Round of 1986,
in turn, the regulation of foreign investment disputes was entertained for the ﬁrst time.86 Relevant
were also frameworks from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Convention and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules from
the 1960s and 1970s, which appear in Chapter 11 as options for settlement procedures. All these
informed American interest in particular in this topic.
But RIOs also inﬂuenced the problematisation of investor rights in NAFTA. In general terms,
NAFTA was the North American response to regional integration in Europe and elsewhere,
and the corresponding perceived need for a far-reaching trade agreement supported by an
enforceable regulatory framework. This applied to the movement of capital as well, especially
for the United States and Mexico. Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin describe for
instance how Mexican President Carlos Salinas, upon returning from a trip to Europe in 1990,
realised that ‘Mexico could not count on its creditors for economic aid [and that] it would
have to seek capital from foreign investors’.87 Indeed, ‘the shift in the global economy toward
gigantic regional economic blocks, such as the creation of a common market in Europe, left Mexico
with few choices. … Remaining closed was not an option, and unilateral liberalization seemed to
have few beneﬁts.’88 The choice was therefore ‘negotiated liberalisation’ in North America. Broadly
speaking, then, the European experience mattered. In more speciﬁc terms, the presence of two
RIOs with dispute settlement institutions – more importantly the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) with its investor protection clauses89 and, probably to some extent, the
1987 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, with its binding
arbitration tribunal – virtually ensured that the topic would be an issue at least for debate in the
NAFTA context.90
CUSFTA in particular inﬂuenced the framing phase. It offered one way of categorising the problem
(the liberalisation of capital movement cannot occur if investors worry about the safety of
their international investments) and offered a possible solution (investor rights should therefore be
protected thought not if it means loss of national sovereignty). Hence ‘Canada wanted to keep
83 Alan M. Rugman and Michael Gestrin, ‘NAFTA’s treatment of foreign investment’, in Alan M. Rugman (ed.),
Foreign Investment and NAFTA (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 48–50.
84 Ray Jones, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-to-state dispute resolution: a shield to be embraced or a sword to be
feared?’, Brigham Young University Law Review, 22:2 (2002), pp. 527–59.
85 Barton Legum, ‘The innovation of investor-state arbitration under NAFTA’, Harvard International Law
Journal, 43:2 (2002), pp. 531–39.
86 Norris C. Clement et al., North American Economic Integration: Theory and Practice (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999).
87 Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 1.
88 Ibid.
89 Oelstrom, ‘A treaty for the future’, pp. 799–802.
90 Jennifer A. Heindl, ‘Toward a history of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven’, Berkeley Journal of International Law,
24:2 (2006), p. 680.
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Chapter 11 as close to CUSFTA provisions as possible. Early bracketed texts were dominated by
Canadian exceptions and limiting clariﬁcations’.91 CUFSTA had also granted governments the right
to review certain types of foreign investments – something also of importance to Canada.92
With CUFSTA’s basic approach already shaping NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism for
anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases,93 its potential applicability to investments was clear.
At the same time, the US was ‘interested in expanding even beyond the measures included in its
maximalist bilateral agreements, and insisted from the beginning on starting from scratch, rather
than building on CUSFTA. The United States was hoping to avoid such a provision in NAFTA’.94
Hence, if only in a negative sense, CUFSTA helped deﬁne the American position as well. The
United States’ stance, we should note, was in a positive sense more in line with the principles found in
a number of recent bilateral investment treaties, which themselves followed the principles of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, the Additional
Facility Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention,
and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules. In the case
of the United States and Canada, then, CUFSTA very much helped frame the issues and
solutions on hand.
When it came to scripting, however, NAFTA planners departed signiﬁcantly from the existing design
of any RIO. As Kristin L. Oelstrom put it, ‘the dispute settlement provisions for investors form one
section of the NAFTA that is not modelled on previous trade agreements’.95 The key characteristic of
the dispute settlement mechanism on investments was something unprecedented for an RIO: it
allowed investors to sue directly a country or subnational jurisdiction. All past multinational trade
agreements required investors to ask their states to sue on their behalf.96 This was the outcome the
United States wanted given its fear of autocratic Mexican governmental actions over foreign
investments – one that predictably caused considerable uproar over time among legal scholars and
the public alike. In this regard, if there was diffusion, it was from bilateral investment treaties, which
typically allowed for investor-state disputes.97 A second novel feature of NAFTA was the adoption
of a ‘negative list’ of industries that would be exempt from the stated protection obligations (whereas
past practice in CUSFTA and other RIOs required the listing of industries that were covered by those
obligations).98 A third and major innovation was the wide interpretation of investments as including
‘minority interests, portfolio investment, and real estate property’.99
The ﬁnal design of NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism in the investment area was thus
remarkably innovative and standard-setting (Mercosur’s 1994 Protocol of Colonia, for instance,
would subscribe to the investor-state dispute concept). But these novelties do not mean that diffusion
91 Ibid.
92 Heindl, ‘Toward a history of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven’, pp. 682–3.
93 Chapter 19; see Cherie O’Neil Taylor, ‘Dispute resolution as a catalyst for economic integration and an agent
for deepening integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?’, Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business, 17:1 (1997), p. 854.
94 Heindl, ‘Toward a history of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven’, pp. 680–1.
95 Oelstrom, ‘A treaty for the future’, p. 800.
96 Legum, ‘The innovation of investor-state arbitration under NAFTA’; Oelstrom, ‘A treaty for the future’.
97 Jones, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-to-state dispute resolution’, p. 530.
98 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges (Washington,
DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005), p. 202.
99 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited, p. 214.
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from other RIOs did not happen in the problematisation and framing phases. There, the experiences
of the EU and CUSFTA especially proved important.
Southern African Development Community
The Treaty of Windhoek transformed the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference
into today’s SADC with the goal of integrating the members’ economies into an EU-type common
market. Previously, it was a loosely structured organisation built upon ﬁnancial and technical
support by international donors aimed at withstanding South Africa’s apartheid destabilisation
policies vis-à-vis its neighbours through functional cooperation in selected policy areas. There was
nothing ‘natural’ about the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism in the transformed SADC.
How did dispute settlement become problematised? Discussions of transforming the organisation
started in the region in the late 1980s. At this time, political debates initially problematised a variety
of issues associated with the functioning of sectoral cooperation, and less so the institutional
framework of the organisation per se. For example, a virulent issue in the late 1980s was the
selection criteria and approval procedure of projects that underwent changes due to the lack of
coordination between regional and national political priorities.100 In none of these debates
was dispute settlement ever an issue, suggesting that there were no direct internal reasons for
problematisation. In fact, an expert team that had been tasked to make recommendations on a
revised institutional structure for the organisation in light of the envisaged transformation in its
mandate noted that SADC’s institutions ‘are adequate and effective generally’. It presented a list of
institutions to be ofﬁcially included in a new Treaty, which did not contain a dispute settlement
mechanism.101
Instead, problematisation diffused from the outside. Even though the aforementioned expert group
did mention that ‘settlement of disputes shall be by arbitration’,102 dispute settlement only rose to the
agenda as a problem that required political action with the 1992 Consultative Conference, an annual
meeting of SADC ofﬁcials and representatives from external donors, which is widely seen as ‘the
most important event in the SADC’s calendar of activities’.103 The theme document, which is used by
donors to make ﬁnancial pledges for the following period, engaged, for the ﬁrst time, justiﬁcations
for different approaches to economic integration in the region. Elaborated in cooperation with the
most important donor agencies, including representatives from the EU, it clearly stated that a
regional development community ‘requires mechanisms of mediation and arbitration’.104 The next
Council of Ministers meeting then set the issue onto the political agenda.105 Nothing in the SADC
context per se can explain this problematisation. Instead, the documents for the 1992 conference
suggest that problematisation diffused from another RIO: the idea that economic integration requires
100 Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen, Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future. From the Conference to
a Community (Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, 1994), pp. 38–9.
101 South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) Council of Ministers, Record of the Council
of Ministers Held in Arusha, Tanzania on the 22nd and 23rd of August (1991), p. 379.
102 Ibid.
103 James Sidaway, ‘The (geo)politics of regional integration: the example of the Southern African Development
Community’, Environment and Planning D, 16:5 (1998), p. 564.
104 SADCC, ‘Towards economic integration’, The Proceedings of the 1992 Annual Consultative Conference Held
in Maputo, Mozambique, 29–31 January (1992), pp. 41–2.
105 SADCC Council, Record of the Council of Ministers Held in Arusha, p. 35, emphasis added.
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mechanisms for dispute settlement came from the European experience, and was transferred by
European experts who participated in the formulation of the theme document.
In this case, problematisation was closely linked to framing. The ﬁrst expert group initially framed
the choice as one between an arbitration tribunal, which was a reform proposal being discussed in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the time,106 and a committee, which was the
existing GATT mechanism.107 Yet after the Secretariat had depicted the move towards economic
integration as involving a choice between ‘the proposed North American free trade zone or the
European Economic Community’,108 policymakers started considering a wider range of frames for
dispute settlement that also involved the more centralised form of arbitration of a standing court. All
of these frames shared two key characteristics. They diffused from other international and regional
organisations rather than constituting endogenous creations, and they categorised the problem of
arbitration as one of choosing the right institutions with possible solutions requiring delegating
competences to an independent body instead of a politically dominated process. At their ﬁrst meeting
after the consultative conference, the organisation’s Council of Ministers adopted this frame when
noting that a regional Tribunal was to be among ‘the central intergovernmental organs of the
community’.109 It was eventually codiﬁed in the Windhoek Treaty (Art. 16), which provided for the
establishment of a permanent Tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction and the power to ‘give advisory
opinions’ over all matters of the treaty and subsidiary instruments. In accounting for the fact that
policymakers eventually chose a more institutionalised solution to the problem of arbitration, Lenz
plausibly suggests that this was due to the fact that political leaders were eager to retain credibility
with important international cooperation partners amidst rumours to withdraw funding from the
organisation after the end of the Cold War, among which the EU was the most important.110
The Tribunal’s speciﬁc institutional features – its scripts – were to be laid down in a separate
protocol, work on which started several years later. By that time, designing the Tribunal based on the
template of the new dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization, with which the
Windhoek stipulations were fully compatible, appeared like the ‘natural’ choice for a group of
countries that were largely unwilling to cede signiﬁcant amounts of sovereignty. When signing the
protocol in 2002, however, policymakers showed ‘a revealed preference to emulate the ECJ’ due to
three key institutional features of the Tribunal: a supranational Commission that monitors state
compliance, a preliminary rulings mechanism that is a literal copy of Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome, and a system of administrative and constitutional review that provides for private access.111
As before, this choice was readily explicable by a mix of EU-oriented epistemic communities
that were involved in the Protocol’s drafting, as well as an external context characterised by
another legitimacy crisis with external donors, on which the organisation continued to be highly
dependent.112 In sum, the SADC Tribunal constitutes an instance of extensive diffusion, with
all of the three decision-making steps leading to the ﬁnal outcomes inﬂuenced by external models,
above all the EU’s.
106 Manfred Elsig, and Jappe Eckardt, ‘The creation of the multilateral trade court: Design and experiential
learning’, World Trade Review, 14:S1 (2015), p. S25.
107 SADCC Council, Record of the Council of Ministers Held in Arusha, p. 379.
108 SADCC Council, Record of the Council of Ministers, 28 August (1991), p. 361.
109 SADCC, ‘Towards economic integration’, p. 35.
110 Lenz, ‘Spurred emulation’, pp. 165–6.
111 Alter, ‘The global spread of European Style International Courts’, p. 145; see also Alter, The New Terrain of
International Law.
112 See Lenz, ‘Spurred emulation’, pp. 166–7.
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Conclusion: Theoretical implications and conditions of diffusion
In this article, we have sought to reﬁne our understanding of diffusion’s causal inﬂuence on RIOs.
Drawing on insights from public policy research and sociological work on organisations, we offered
a conceptual framework that allows scholars to extend their focus beyond the ﬁnal design of policy
and institutional outcomes (scripts, in our terminology). We suggested that policies and institutional
arrangements in RIOs result from three distinct decision-making stages: problematisation, framing,
and scripting. Diffusion across RIOs can affect any combination of these three stages. Convergence
thus need not be the only marker of diffusion: diffusion can happen also when we observe persistent
variation in ﬁnal design. We illustrated this conceptual logic with a structured comparison of the
establishment of dispute settlement institutions in the EEC, NAFTA, and SADC. In this section, we
discuss three theoretical implications of our analysis and propose two general conditions under
which diffusion is likely to affect the three stages of decision-making in RIOs.
As to theoretical implications, the ﬁndings suggest, ﬁrst, a reconsideration of the nature of diffusion
as a causal force. Much of the literature, not only on RIOs but beyond, depicts diffusion as a force
for convergence in ﬁnal designs.113 From this perspective, diffusion accounts are generally seen as
posing a theoretical challenge to functional theories of institutional design and public policymaking.
Our analysis indicates that this view is overly narrow. Especially if diffusion triggers the recognition
of a situation as a problem that requires political action (problematisation) and shapes the way in
which the problem is understood (framing), it provides a strong impetus for departing from the
status quo, independent of the resulting ﬁnal outcome – thus, it constitutes a force for change. If this
argument is correct, diffusion accounts challenge a potentially much larger class of theoretical
approaches including, above all, certain variants of neo-institutionalist theories that predict orga-
nisational stability. Historical institutionalism, in particular, has identiﬁed powerful forces – sunk
costs, adaptive expectations, learning and coordination effects, and resistance by the beneﬁciaries of
the status quo – that reinforce the continuity of institutional arrangements.114 Similarly, a large
sociological literature contends that institutions rest on shared normative routines and commitments
that have a tendency to be chronically reproduced. This has led to a widespread assumption, present
also among International Relations scholars, that international organisations ‘are notoriously
resistant to reform or redirection’.115 Our analysis suggests that diffusion dynamics might undermine
the endogenous self-reinforcement dynamics characteristic of path dependent processes. In this sense,
diffusion pressures act effectively as an external shock on the receiving organisation – and their role
is thus consistent with the thinking of some neo-institutionalists who see external shocks as the
primary causes of disruption triggering organisational change. The speciﬁc ways in which diffusion
does so invites further research.
Second, our framework contributes to the debate among scholars on ‘whether or not diffusion
implies the adoption of some variant of the original model’.116 There is a growing view, resisted by
some, that even non-adoption might indicate diffusion to the extent that a particular model is
considered for adoption, even if it is ultimately rejected.117 The claim has merit, and the two
113 For a crique of this view in sociology, see Beckert, ‘Institutional isomorphism revisited’; Elkins and Simmons,
‘On waves, clusters, and diffusion’, p. 36.
114 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’, Annual Review of Political Science,
2 (1999), pp. 369–404; Pierson, Politics in Time.
115 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, p. 2.
116 Solingen and Börzel, ‘Introduction’, p. 9.
117 For example Risse, ‘The diffusion of regionalism’, pp. 5–6.
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positions appear contending because they in fact focus on different stages of decision-making:
whereas the mainstream view – non-adoption indicates non-diffusion – recognises diffusion only in
ﬁnal designs, the other position essentially acknowledges, as do we, that diffusion might operate at
earlier stages of decision-making. When a model is considered for adoption and ultimately rejected as
a template for ﬁnal design, it might nevertheless subtly shape the way an existing arrangement is
problematised, or it might frame, in a generic fashion, the problem and potential solutions. In this
sense, even non-adoption of the institutional template can indicate a causal role for diffusion.
The NAFTA case offers an example.
A third theoretical implication concerns the interaction between diffusion pressures and domestic
politics in shaping outcomes. Diffusion studies are often set against explanations emphasising
internal factors in general and domestic politics in particular. The common conceptualisation of
diffusion as concerning ﬁnal design is at the root of this disagreement. It has led scholars to treat the
two sets of factors as theoretical antitheses: if a decision to adopt a particular policy or institution
can be explained as the result of diffusion it cannot be explained by domestic politics and vice versa.
Our framework offers an alternative perspective. By distinguishing discrete stages in decision-making
processes, we open up analytical space for both diffusion and domestic politics to matter in a
sequential fashion. We gave some illustrations of this when introducing our conceptual framework;
our three empirical illustrations, more systematically, displayed different sequences of the key
‘dynamics of “imitation and innovation” through which transnational models are instantiated in
national settings’.118 We hence recognise conceptually, not just empirically, that diffusion and
domestic politics do not constitute antitheses, and provide one coherent way for conceptualising their
interaction.
This helps to shed new light on the localisation debate. Localisation scholars recognise diffusion as a
salient inﬂuence on local processes but highlight processes of translation and adaptation of foreign
norms, ideas, and models by local actors. Convergence, these scholars contend, is hardly ever an
outcome under such circumstances, and local actors should enjoy analytical primacy.119 Our
framework suggests that these arguments tend to be based on the misguided dichotomy that an
outcome is affected primarily either by domestic politics or by diffusion. These scholars actually
recognise that, in our terminology, it need not be ﬁnal designs but can also be problems or frames
that diffuse from abroad. While domestic politics might be the major determinant of scripting, as
these scholars contend, diffusion can nevertheless shape problematisation or framing – as was the
case in the EEC and NAFTA. Thus, this controversy appears overblown if we recognise conceptually
that domestic politics and diffusion can affect different stages in decision-making.
We end by reﬂecting on one ﬁnal question: Under what conditions is diffusion likely to inﬂuence RIO
decision-making? The above empirical illustrations, as well as other diffusion research, suggest two
general conditions. First, we expect network ties to play an important role. The closer such network
ties, the more likely is diffusion going to be. Two types of network ties are relevant here. One is
overlap in membership. The higher the membership overlap between two RIOs, the more likely will
diffusion affect decision-making because relevant information ﬂows are likely to occur.120 This is
118 Marc Schneiberg and Elisabeth Clemens, ‘The typical tools for the job: Research strategies in institutional
analysis’, Sociological Theory, 24:3 (2006), p. 200.
119 See fns 3 and 11.
120 Hyeran Jo and Hyun Namgung, ‘Dispute settlement mechanisms in preferential trade agreements: Democracy,
boilerplates, and the multilateral trade regime’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 56:6 (2012), pp. 1041–68.
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what we saw in the EEC and NAFTA cases, where shared membership across two legally distinct
RIOs was a powerful facilitator of diffusion. These two cases also suggest that such membership
overlap is most likely to affect the framing stage, and maybe also problematisation. It appears to
leave more room for innovation at the scripting stage. Another relevant network tie, especially visible
in the SADC case, is interaction with a powerful organisational pioneer. The EU is generally seen as
the most successful example of regional integration, and it actively supports such processes in other
organisations.121 Close ties with the pioneer appear to increase the likelihood of diffusion across
stages of decision-making. Whether this inﬂuence lessens as we move from problematisation
to scripting remains to be analysed. The absence of such close ties, in turn, might explain why
NAFTA appeared less inﬂuenced by the EU model of dispute settlement.
While network ties are relational and therefore tend to be actor-oriented, diffusion is also facilitated
by broader structural conditions. A second condition, then, is that the total amount of RIOs in which
problems, frames, or scripts have diffused affects the likelihood of diffusion to other RIOs. In an
analogy to David Strang’s inﬂuential deﬁnition of diffusion,122 we might hypothesise that the prior
adoption of a problem, frame, or script in a population alters the probability of adoption of
remaining non-adopters. Concerning dispute settlement, we would thus expect that the more RIOs
problematise the issue in their organisation, the higher the likelihood that other RIOs will follow suit.
The same hypotheses can be rendered for frames and scripts. Once a certain threshold level of
adopters is reached at each stage, a speciﬁc problem, frame, or script assumes a taken-for-granted
character, and is therefore likely to diffuse more rapidly.123 Over time, then, variation in
problematisation, framing, and scripting within the population is likely to diminish – a hypothesis
well known from world polity theory.124 What our framework adds to this idea is that this
structuration process follows a sequential logic that evolves from problematisation through framing
towards scripting. In other words, we are likely to see structuration tendencies ﬁrst in
problematisation, then in framing, and ﬁnally in scripting.
This sequential macro-hypothesis appears to be consistent with the general evolution of dispute
settlement in RIOs and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that is the subject of much recent
analysis. The relevant literature indicates that some form of institutionalised dispute settlement in
RIOs and PTAs is becoming increasingly common, which implies, in turn, that RIOs and PTAs
without any such mechanism have become rare.125 This suggests that the issue of dispute settlement
is problematised almost ‘automatically’ when such agreements are being negotiated. In other words,
variation across RIOs and PTAs appears to have decreased enormously in problematisation. Yet
increasing similarity goes further. Beyond problematisation, most RIOs and PTAs nowadays feature
dispute settlement mechanisms that involve independent third parties as adjudicators, implying
that dispute settlement is increasingly framed as a problem that requires independent adjudication.
Nevertheless, in terms of scripting much variation appears to remain. It is at this stage of
121 Lenz, ‘EU normative power and regionalism’.
122 David Strang, ‘Adding social structure to diffusion models’, Sociological Methods and Research, 19:3 (1991),
p. 325.
123 This is an important element of Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm cycle. See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization 52:4 (1998),
pp. 887–917.
124 DiMaggio and Powell, ‘The iron cage revisited’, p. 156.
125 Karen Alter and Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Regional dispute settlement’, in Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (eds),
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Smith,
‘The politics of dispute settlement design’.
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decision-making that diffusion is potentially the least widespread, partly because no single
uncontested model of how to address dispute settlement design has emerged. Clearly articulating
and rigorously testing such hypotheses across stages of decision-making remains a fruitful area for
future research.
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association Conference in
Toronto, March 2014. We thank the participants at the meeting, as well as Julia Gray, Joe Jupille,
three anonymous reviewers and the editors for their most useful comments. Tobias Lenz acknowl-
edges support from the European Research Council Advanced Grant #249543 ‘Causes and Con-
sequences of Multilevel Governance’, and a Daimler and Benz Foundation postdoctoral scholarship.
Biographical information
Francesco Duina is Professor and Chair of Sociology at Bates College (US) and Honorary Professor
of Sociology at the University of British Columbia (Canada). His research focuses on comparative
regional integration. His most recent articles have appeared in New Political Economy; Regulation
& Governance; and Comparative European Politics. He is the author of The Social Construction of
Free Trade: The EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur (Princeton University Press) and other books on the
institutional underpinnings of international economic life. From 2010–15, he sat on the editorial
board of the Journal of European Public Policy.
Tobias Lenz is Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute. He is currently on leave from
the University of Goettingen, Germany, and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA),
Hamburg, where he is Assistant Professor (Juniorprofessor) of Global Governance and Comparative
Regionalism. He holds a DPhil in International Relations and an MPhil in Politics, both from Oxford
University. His research interests include international organisations, comparative regionalism,
diffusion, EU external relations, and IR theory. His current work focuses on processes of institutional
change in regional organisations and the inﬂuence of the European Union on such processes.
Regionalism and diffusion revisited
797
